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1
Introduction: Gezi

My classmates and I were in Germany, waiting for the U-Bahn to come, when the news
broadcast on the big screen started to talk about the protests in Turkey. We were there on a
school trip, enjoying our time, while on the streets near our high school, as we saw on the
subway screen, there were large crowds chanting in anger. Against them stood the riot police,
armed with tear gas as usual. Some of us texted our friends and parents to figure out what was
going on. I believe someone, maybe my mother, told me not to worry about it. When we were
back in Istanbul to finish off the semester, there were days where they would not let us leave the
school for our safety. That, however, did nothing to prevent our throats from getting sour and
sore, from burning.
Compared to other cities of similar size and importance, Istanbul is rather poor when it
comes to city squares and parks. So when President Erdogan declared in 2013 that he is planning
on demolishing Gezi Park next to Taksim Square to rebuild a long-gone Ottoman barracks and
add a shopping mall (and maybe a luxury residential complex), Istanbulites felt the righteous
urge to revolt. Near eight million people would be involved in the protests of Summer 2013 that
resulted in twenty-two deaths and more than eight thousand injuries. The park thankfully stands
today, next to the ugly gray brick floor that is Taksim Square.
Because the protests evolved to cover a wide range of concerns surrounding Erdogan’s
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government –– infringements on constitutional rights such
as the freedom of the press and speech, disregard for the secular structure of the republic, etc. ––
it is easy to forget what sparked the riots: dissatisfaction with the way Istanbul was managed. As
Amnesty International reports, “anger was caused not just by the destruction of the park but also
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the opaque way in which the decision for the redevelopment project was taken, which critics
described as characteristic not just of urban regeneration projects but, more generally, of a
government unwilling to respect or listen to opposing opinion.”1 What Erdogan was attempting
to do, in an authoritarian fashion, was to redesign a central part of Istanbul to serve specific
interests: the Ottoman barracks to appeal to his voting base, the shopping mall to benefit
merchants and tourists, and the residential complex to pamper the real estate sector. In short,
Erdogan’s vision for the Gezi Park was an instance of the type of neoliberal urbanism exhibited
by the AKP government since their rule in the city started in 2002. The city, according to the
neoliberal logic, would not belong to its residents, but to those who wanted to utilize it as a space
of accumulation, and if their wishes were to contradict with that of the Istanbulites, c’est la vie.
This was for sure one of the reasons why the AKP government lost the metropolitan municipality
of Istanbul to the Republican People’s Party (CHP) earlier this year.
Here I start with an attempt to define neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism (Chapter 1),
and then take a long-historical view of neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism in Turkey, starting
with an overview of the Ottoman Empire and building all the way up to 2019 (Chapter 2). The
goal here is to expose some path-dependencies (corruption, statism, authoritarianism, Islamism)
that might help the reader make sense of the current situation. The general historical review ends
with the Decisions of January 24 and the 1980 coup, when Turkey enters its own neoliberal age,
and then I focus specifically on post-1980 Istanbul –– mass-bulldozings, megamosques, crazy
highways, et cetera (Chapter 3). Scholars, even when they do not label it as such, have shown
how and to what extent Istanbul has become a neoliberal city. My contribution comes in Chapter
4, where I make the case that neoliberal urbanism can be seen also in Antalya, Turkey’s tourism

1

“Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey,” Amnesty International, October
2013, pp. 6
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capital. I focus on one specific urban renewal project of sheer enormity, Sur Yapi Antalya, as a
prime example of neoliberal urbanism. In conclusion, I draw attention to the entrepreneurial
local government model embraced by Fatih Mehmet Maçoğlu, the mayor of Tunceli also known
as the “Communist President,” as an alternative approach to urban management, and potentially
a better one.

4
Chapter 1: What is Neoliberal Urbanism?

1.1: Neoliberalism?
To understand neoliberal urbanism, we need to take a step back and define neoliberalism,
an enigmatic scholarly concept that is utilized by many social scientists. Here I summarize two
complementary attempts at conceptualizing neoliberalism: David Harvey’s2 description in A
Brief History of Neoliberalism, and Michel Foucault’s3 1978-79 lectures at the Collége de
France, released under the title “The Birth of Biopolitics.” While Harvey provides a chronology
of neoliberalism, Foucalt tracks the intellectual roots of this ideology. In the end, I provide my
own definition.

1.1.1: David Harvey
According to Harvey, the doctrine of neoliberalism is associated primarily with Paul
Volcker (former chair of the US Federal Reserve) and Ronald Reagen in the United States, Keith
Joseph (British politician with connections to the neoliberal Institute of Economic Affairs) and
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Deng Xiaoping in post-Mao China. They enacted
sweeping pro-market reforms in their countries during the years of 1978-1980, potentially having
marked the period “as a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history,”4
initiating the age of neoliberalism. For Harvey,
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by

2

British Marxist economic geographer, currently a professor at The Graduate Center, CUNY.
French philosopher and social theorist, famous for his work on power and knowledge. Died in 1984.
4
Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 1
3
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strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 5

This role may include guaranteeing the stability of the currency, policing, maintaining a reliable
judicial system, providing military services, and, “by force if need be, [ensuring] the proper
functioning of markets.”6 Any state intervention in markets is suspect, because the state does not
have enough information to assign or meddle with prices, and interest groups will most definitely
skew such interventions in their own favor.
Having infiltrated all geographies and all sorts of institutions, from universities to think
tanks to media to corporations to international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank
(WB), and the World Trade Organization, neoliberalism “has… become hegemonic as a mode of
discourse.”7 In fact, neoliberal thinking has become the way in which many people conduct their
daily lives, having accepted market exchange “as an ethic in itself.”8
An important aspect of neoliberalism is that, because market transactions are deemed to
be sacred, its proponents want to maximize their volume, for which “technologies of information
creation and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use massive databases to
guide decisions in the global marketplace”9 are crucial. The availability of such technologies
enables “time-space compression,”10 diminishing the physical constraints that are traditionally
associated with trade and commerce.
The first attempt to form a neoliberal state, Harvey suggests, was after Pinochet’s USbacked 1973 coup in Chile against the government of Salvador Allende, the former

5

Harvey, pp. 2
Harvey, pp. 2, emphasis mine.
7
Harvey, pp. 3
8
Treanor, Paul, “Neoliberalism: origins, theory, definition,” cited in Harvey, pp. 3
9
Harvey, pp. 3
10
Harvey, pp. 4
6

6
democratically elected Marxist president: “I am working for Socialism and through Socialism.”11
The neoliberal agenda found its way into Chile via the University of Chicago-trained Chilean
economists, who would later come to dominate the Catholic University in Santiago and were
brought by Pinochet into the government after the coup: “Working alongside the IMF… they
reversed the nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up natural resources (fisheries,
timber, etc.) to private and unregulated exploitations (in many cases riding roughshod over the
claims of indigenous inhabitants), privatized social security, and facilitated foreign direct
investment and freer trade… Export-led growth was favoured over import substitution.12”13 The
partial success of the Chilean experiment would encourage the enactment of similar policies later
on in the US and the UK.
Why the turn? After World War II, an “embedded liberalism” was adopted by many
advanced capitalist countries, in which markets, corporations, and entrepreneurs were subject to
state regulation and forced to function under certain social and political constraints. The belief
was that “the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its
citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening
in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends.”14 This approach worked
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but near the end of its second decade, it started to break down.

11

Régis Debray, Conversations with Allende: Socialism in Chile, Verso, New York, 1971 Translation by Peter
Beglan.
12
“Favoured” might imply intervention, but the way this was achieved was mostly through “the elimination of all
non-tariff barriers, the gradual reduction of customs tariffs and their consolidation into three levels (with a maximum
rate of 60%), unification of the exchange rate, and a devaluation to compensate for the reduction in the average
tariff.” In the late 1980s, however, Chile would start adopting more “pragmatic” measures to boost exports: “tariff
drawbacks for exporters, a subsidy for new exports, and foreign direct investment policies which ultimately
favoured non-mining exports.” For more on the topic, see: Agosin, Manuel R., “Trade and Growth in Chile,” Cepal
Review, 68
13
Harvey, pp. 8
14
Harvey, pp. 10
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Stagflation (partially caused by the 1973-74 OAPEC oil crisis15), fiscal crises, and the failure of
the fixed exchange rates backed by gold reserves suggested to the general population that a new
system had to be devised. Socialist and communist parties started to gather support, which was
“a clear political threat to economic elites and ruling classes everywhere, both in the advanced
capitalist countries (such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal)16 and in many developing
countries (such as Chile, Mexico, and Argentina).”17 In the meanwhile, embedded liberalism had
reduced the share of income received by the elites. This was not that bothersome as long as the
economies kept growing. When stagnation became the norm, however, the elites started to also
feel the economic threat. To their help came the once-fringe ideas of Friedrich von Hayek and
the Mont Pelerin Society (founded in 1947), which claimed in their mission statement to identify
“a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market,” two pillars of freedom as
supposedly understood by the Western civilization. Equipped with the neoclassical theories of
Marshall, Jevons and Walras, they opposed state intervention and central planning, and thus
received financial and political support from the business elite. The Heritage Foundation in
Washington and the Institute of Economic Affairs in London are known to be the heirs of the
Mont Pelerin Society, and in academia it was Milton Friedman and his colleagues at the
University of Chicago who carried the flag for years.

15

1973-74 oil crisis started when “the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) instituted an
oil embargo on the United States” to protest the $2.2 billion of emergency aid to Israel for the Yom Kippur War.
The embargo was followed by oil production cuts. Such manipulation of oil supply and availability resulted in high
oil prices that stayed even after the embargo was lifted in 1974. See Corbett, Michael, “Oil Shock of 1973–74,”
Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013
16
Peculiarly enough, Harvey does not include the United States on this list. While not successful in parliamentary
politics (they were not huge fans of it anyway), the Progressive Labor Party was an active force in politics at-large.
The following were also a collective force to be reckoned with: hippies, Yippies, Martin Luther King and the Poor
People’s Campaign, Students for Democratic Society, Baran and Sweezy, The Weather Underground
Organization…
17
Harvey, pp. 15, emphasis mine.
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The policy outcome of this ideology is commonly known as the Washington Consensus,
a term originally coined by John Williamson18 in 1990 to refer to the ten policy interventions
that, according to him, most people in Washington then found to be necessary to help the Latin
American countries with their crises:
1) Budget deficits should be small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation tax.
2) Public expenditure should be redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more
resources than their economic return can justify toward neglected fields with high economic
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary education and
health, and infrastructure.
3) Tax reform so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates.
4) Financial liberalization, involving an ultimate objective of market-determined interest rates.
5) A unified exchange rate at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in
nontraditional exports.
6) Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively
reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 percent was achieved.
7) Abolition of barriers impeding the entry of FDI (foreign direct investment).
8) Privatization of state enterprises.
9) Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition.
10) The provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector. 19

Williamson rightfully contends that people have much more than this set in mind when they use
the term “Washington Consensus” to refer to the neoliberal agenda. He points out that this set
leaves out “capital account liberalization… monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal
state (getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution)... ideas [that] have
rarely dominated thought in Washington and certainly never commanded a consensus there or
anywhere much else except perhaps at meetings of the Mont Pelerin Society.”20 These were
ideas, however, that took hold in many international institutions, such as in the IMF and the
World Bank.

18

A senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 1981, former WB Chief Economist for
South Asia (1996-1999)
19
Williamson, John, “The Strange History of the Washington Consensus,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
Vol. 27, No. 2, Winter 2004-2005
20
Williamson, John, “Did The Washington Consensus Fail?”, Outline of speech at the Center for Strategic &
International Studies Washington, DC, November 6, 2002
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1.1.2: Michel Foucault
In his 1978-79 lectures, Foucault provides an intellectual history of neoliberalism,
starting with the crises of the Weimar Republic. While German neoliberalism would flourish
during the post-war reconstruction, relevant ideas could be traced back to the mid-1920s when
economists such as Walter Eucken (a disciple of Husserl; anti-Keynes) and Wilhelm Röpke
(anti-Keynes) were trying to solve the problem of “how to link together the legitimacy of a state
and the freedom of economic partners, while accepting that the second must found the first, or
serve as its guarantee.”21 For Foucault, neoliberalism is a governmental rationality that takes as
its basis “the existence and practice of economic freedom,”22 and arranges its matters (law,
policy, mission) accordingly. This is one of the primary differences between the classical
liberalism of Adam Smith and J.S. Mill, and the neoliberalism of Eucken, Röpke, and Hayek:
while the former tries to make the market work by trying to limit the given state, the latter tries to
create a state that is based on this “non-state space of economic freedom.”23 The goal is not an
economy under a state, but a state that is inherently economic. In the case of post-war Germany,
which was practically demolished, the (re)founding of the state on a purely economic basis was
quite literal, compelling Foucault to suggest that the contemporary Germany of the 1970s can be
understood as “a radically economic state.”24 The primary actor of this (re)founding was Ludwig
Erhard, a proud member of the Mont Pelerin society, around whom the Scientific Council had
met at Frankfurt in 1948 to discuss the matter. He would become, in 1963, the second Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany.

21

Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978-19, Picador, 2004, translated
by Graham Burchell, 2008, pp. 105
22
Foucault, pp. 86
23
Foucault, pp. 87
24
Foucault, pp. 86
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The neoliberal doctrine, Foucault claims, is a re-engineered version of the liberal
doctrine. The crucial step in this process of reengineering is “a shift from exchange to
competition in the principle of the market,”25 as the latter ensures economic rationality by
forming prices, thus regulating choices. What is especially new about the German neoliberals,
however, is that they do not believe in laissez-faire as the best approach to fostering competition.
They are well aware that competition is not a natural phenomenon, but instead a formal structure
that needs to be built and maintained, which is the government’s job. As Foucault puts it, this
neoliberal government should be identified with “permanent vigilance, activity, and
intervention.”26 Their interventions cannot include “price control, support for a particular sector
of the market, systematic job creation, or public investment.27”28 What the government must do
is to engage in so-called “organizing actions” to affect the framework so that “the market
economy can come into play.”29 To provide examples, Foucault explains Eucken’s 1952
approach to the problem of German agriculture:
Basically, he says, agriculture has never been normally, fully, and exhaustively integrated
within the market economy. It has not been integrated within the market economy
because of protective customs that, throughout Europe, have marked off, and cut out the
spaces of European agriculture. These protective customs were made indispensable both
by technical differences and generally by the technical inadequacy of each country’s
agriculture. These differences and inadequacies were entirely linked to an overpopulation that made intervention, the insertion of technical improvements, pointless and,
in truth, undesirable… What will good interventions act on? Well, on the framework.
That is to say, first, on the population. The agricultural population is too large, so it will
have to be reduced by interventions enabling population transfers, migration, and so
on. We will also have to intervene at the level of techniques, by making implements
available, by the technical improvement of elements like fertilizers, et cetera, and also by
the training and education given to farmers, which will enable them to modify
[agricultural] techniques. Third, we will also modify the legal framework of farms, and
25

Foucault, pp. 118
Foucault, pp. 132
27
Foucalt is not explicit when it comes to what he means by “public investment,” but I believe he refers to
investments in state-owned enterprises and, say, healthcare or (to give a contemporary example) federal job
guarantee, given that he calls the kinds of interventions neoliberals would never do “instruments used by planning.”
He is not referring to investments in what we would call infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, sewage et cetera.
28
Foucault, pp. 139
29
Foucault, pp. 141. Emphasis mine.
26
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in particular laws governing inheritance, governing tenant farms and the location of
estates, trying to find the means to get the legislation, structures, and institutions of
society to play a part through action in agriculture, and so on. Fourth, as far as
possible, we will modify the allocation of the soil and the extent, nature, and
exploitation of the soil available. Finally, if necessary, we will have to be able to
intervene on the climate.30

This is one step further than Smith’s monopoly busting. Eucken is suggesting that we engage in
natural and social engineering to smooth out all the rigidities that might prevent competition
from taking place.
Near the end of the series of lectures, Foucalt turns to what social policy looks like under
neoliberalism, defining it as “a counterweight to unrestrained economic processes”31 by ensuring
“relatively equal access to consumer goods.”32 Neoliberals, on the other hand, do not believe in
social policy in this form of an egalitarian force. In fact, they find it anti-economic, as they
believe inequality to be an inherent aspect of competitive market structures. Minor transfers of
income from those who over-consume grossly to those who under-consume terribly can happen,
but only to ensure the subsistence of the latter, nothing more. Under neoliberalism, social policy
becomes the privatization of risk, primarily through individual or mutual insurance. It is not the
state but the individual who is responsible for the mitigation of unforeseen harm.
As the lecture of February 14, 1979, comes to an end, Foucalt sums up all of this in a
single concept: enterprise. What the government is trying to do by taking the market and
competition as its basis, doing its best to create the conditions in which the market can excel, and
outsourcing the responsibility of dealing with the harms of this system to the individuals is
creating an enterprise society. This is not a market society as understood by the uniformity of
commodities and overall standardization of processes, but actually a society in which there is a
30

Foucault, pp. 141. Pardon my liberal citation of Foucault paraphrasing Eucken, but no paraphrasing could do
justice to the implicit humor in Foucault’s rhetoric.
31
Foucalt, pp. 142
32
Foucalt, pp. 142
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continuous drive towards “the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises.”33 Neoliberalism is
that which fosters entrepreneurship in all its colors.

1.1.3: A Working Definition of Neoliberalism, and Some Notes
Drawing from both Harvey and Foucalt’s work, here is the definition of neoliberalism I
propose: neoliberalism is a way of thinking that finds entrepreneurship and competition to be
the forces through which progress can be achieved. This ideology, while indebted to classical
liberalism, originates in the work of Weimar era economists and the Mont Pelerin Society
members such as Hayek and Erhard. According to neoliberalism, the government is responsible
for ensuring the conditions in which entrepreneurship can flourish, and the interventions for that
cause are varied and occasionally violent. From transnational corporations to citizens, all kinds
of agents can be seen as enterprises. The first attempt to establish a neoliberal state was the
post-war Germany. The international policy counterpart of this ideology is the “broad” version
of the Washington Consensus, which includes measures such as capital account liberalization
and the dismantling of the welfare state. Such policies can be understood to be aiming at the
total formal marketization of the world, so that all can compete with all.
Some things need to be clarified at this point. While neoliberalism can be thought of as a
project or an ideology, it is rather naive to think that a pure neoliberal state or city is possible. It
might be more fruitful to think of neoliberalism as a force that acts on an object: the result of this
acting-on will depend on the initial characteristics of the object too. In the case of a country, a
state, or a political community, these characteristics may include already-existing institutions,
norms of governance, sociocultural expectations, geopolitics, national and local histories, and a
plethora of other pre-existing conditions that prevent neoliberalism from appearing in its purest
33

Foucalt, pp. 149
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form. This is why Theodore, Peck, and Brenner choose to talk about “an uneven, contradictory,
and ongoing process of neoliberalization”34 instead. It is therefore more accurate to talk about a
neoliberalized state or city, but I will use the adjective “neoliberal” out of convention.
This acting-on is sometimes thought to be two-staged, creation and destruction, hence the
phrase “creative destruction”35 in association with neoliberalism. The initial “goal” of neoliberal
ideology is to (attempt to) dismantle norms and institutions that are barriers against its ascent,
which is followed by the creation of norms and institutions that are hospitable to it. This creation,
of course, can take the form of transforming existing institutions and structures, and these two
stages of neoliberalization can overlap temporally. In regards to urban phenomena, this creative
destruction is manifested quite literally with urban renewal or revitalization projects (private,
public, and private-public), in addition to the structural and institutional creative destruction that
might take place simultaneously. These two stages are sometimes also called roll-back and rollout phases.
Because it has not come up explicitly so far, there is merit in highlighting the class bias of
neoliberalism.36 Because of its devotion to the logic of competition, neoliberalism becomes a

34

Theodore, Nik, Peck, Jamie, and Brenner, Neil, “Neoliberal Urbanism: Cities and the Rule of Markets,” in The
New Blackwell Companion to The City (2011), Wiley Blackwell, ed. by Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, pp. 17
35
A term made famous by Peter Schumpeter to describe the ever-recurring change in production techniques in
capitalist societies. The rumor has it that Schumpeter borrowed it from Werner Sombart (German economist, 18631941), who probably got it from Nietzsche, who probably got it from Schopenhauer, who probably got it from the
Hindu tradition. See Reinert H., Reinert E.S. (2006) Creative Destruction in Economics: Nietzsche, Sombart,
Schumpeter. In: Backhaus J.G., Drechsler W. (eds) Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). The European Heritage in
Economics and the Social Sciences, vol 3. Springer, Boston, MA
36
This is quite explicit in the 1971 memo by Lewis Powell to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, where he asked the
American businessmen to unite against the attacks on “the enterprise system:”
There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others who openly seek destruction of the system.
There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas for support of the enterprise system.
Nor should there be reluctance to penalize politically those who oppose it.
Lessons can be learned from organized labor in this respect. The head of the AFL-CIO may not appeal to businessmen as
the most endearing or public-minded of citizens. Yet, over many years the heads of national labor organizations have done
what they were paid to do very effectively. They may not have been beloved, but they have been respected — where it
counts the most — by politicians, on the campus, and among the media.
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threat to labor rights and protections. That neoliberal governments try to outsource risk
management is already mentioned above. Unions are also targeted because of their monopolistic
nature, which was previously seen acceptable due to the belief in the freedom of association, and
more importantly because unions were seen as a balancing force to the inherent bargaining
power inequality between the capitalists and the workers. Historically, opening up of national
economies under neoliberalism forced workers from different countries, who have little mobility,
to compete with each other and push wage levels down, while capital was allowed to travel
wherever it saw fit, aided by the rise of financial channels and institutions. It should therefore not
be surprising that the neoliberal project resulted in increased income inequality in the US, the
UK, Russia, China, Mexico, and many other countries.37
Lastly, some scholars want to draw a strict distinction between the German neoliberalism
described by Foucalt (which is also called ordoliberalism) and the Anglo-American variant of it
described by Harvey. Heiskala, for example, says that both agree that markets are the best way to
maximize liberty, freedom and economic opportunities and therefore should be expanded. But,
he continues, while “market fundamentalism á la Hayek”38 holds that markets are self-sufficient
and do not need government intervention, ordoliberals believe that they have to nurture market
structures continuously to curb monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies. There are (at least) two
problems here. Firstly, Hayek, who is supposedly the neoliberal/market-fundamentalist in this
case, had an ambivalent attitude towards antitrust. He argued against large firms when they
It is time for American business — which has demonstrated the greatest capacity in all history to produce and to influence
consumer decisions — to apply their great talents vigorously to the preservation of the system itself.

Earlier in the memo, Powell accuses “the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary
journals, the arts and sciences, and [the] politicians” for leading the attack on the enterprise system. By “the
Marcuses,” Powell refers to the admirers of Herbert Marcuse, the German-American Marxist scholar of the
Frankfurt School. Link: https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/democracy/the-lewis-powell-memo-a-corporateblueprint-to-dominate-democracy/
37
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 16-19
38
Heiskala, Risto, “Is neoliberalism ubiquitous?” Institute for Advanced Social Research, February 28, 2018
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restricted access to essential goods and explicitly barred competitors from entering the market.
While his choice of antitrust enforcement was private firms suing monopolies, he did express his
support for the limitation of such restrictory conduct.39 It might make more sense to give Ludwig
von Mises the throne of market-fundamentalism, who actually despised the German ordoliberals
of the Mont Pelerin Society.40 Secondly, Heiskala calls the US neoliberal (not ordoliberal), hence
supposedly a non-interventionist market-fundamentalist country, but it was Reagan the poster
boy of North American neoliberalism who broke up AT&T in 1982, ending its six-decade long
domination of the sector.41 Given the muddiness of the situation, I do not hesitate to take the
risks associated with clumping them all together under the umbrella of neoliberalism.

1.2: Entrepreneurial Urban Governance
Economies, of course, are in spaces, and exert influences on these spaces. So it is only
natural that this neoliberal turn had an impact on the cities in those countries where neoliberalism
was becoming more and more persuasive. A decade after Foucalt’s Paris lectures, in 1989,
Harvey published his seminal article on the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in
urban governance, in which he shows that urban governments were becoming more involved in
“the exploration of new ways to foster and encourage local development and employment
growth” and less worried with “the local provision of services, facilities and benefits to urban
populations.”42 In other words, it was now being asked of urban governments to adopt an
entrepreneurial stance, and urban governments were responding in the affirmative, at least in the
39

See Paul, Ellen Frankel, “HAYEK ON MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST IN THE CRUCIBLE OF UNITED
STATES V. MICROSOFT,” NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, Vol. 1, December 15, 2014. Also see Kusunoki,
Shigeki, “Hayek and Antitrust,” History of Economics Review, 61:1, 2005, pp 57-68
40
Hülsmann, Jörg Guido, “Against the Neoliberals,” Mises Institute, January 08, 2019
41
Lasar, Matthew, “How AT&T Conquered the 20th Century,” Wired, September 03, 2011
42
Harvey, David, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late
Capitalism,” Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 71, No. 1, The Roots of Geographical Change:
1973 to the Present, 1989, pp. 3

16
UK and the US. As the reasons for this development, Harvey cites chronic unemployment,
deindustrialization, fiscal austerity, much stronger appeal to market rationality, and the tide of
neoconservatism that took hold of many advanced capitalist countries in the 1970s. He also
claims that “the declining powers of the nation state to control multinational money flows”43
might be resulting in partnerships between international finance capital and local governance in
an attempt to transform localities into attractive spots for investment. By governance it is meant
more than just the government: governance refers to the large web of governing actors such as
the government, local chambers of commerce, financiers, industrialists, merchants, business
leaders, real estate and property developers, educational and religious institutions, local labor
organizations, and so on. All these different parties get together and each party argues for the
specific kind of civic boosterism that would benefit them. In “successful” cases, coalitions and
alliances are established between different parties, which often requires “a person of vision,
tenacity, and skill”44 to be in charge.
Harvey suggests that there are three important aspects of this new entrepreneurial urban
governance model. Firstly, the idea of public-private partnerships is central. Local governments
try to attract external funding, direct investment, and new sources of employment, and are down
to work with private capital. Secondly, the risk in such partnerships, which are often speculative
to an important degree, are regularly absorbed by local governments, making them especially
attractive for the capitalists. Thirdly, this entrepreneurial stance tries to improve the place rather
than the territory, that is, its primary goal is not to improve the conditions of those living in the
area. Investments in housing and education would be improving the territory, as they would
benefit the population directly, but it is hard to characterize an investment in a stadium or a
43
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convention center in a similar vein.45 Such investments aim to make the place more attractive for
the global population at-large and, more importantly, for global capitalists and landowners, the
latter benefiting from the rising land prices surrounding such spectacle investments.
Harvey believes this trend to be contagious as it may spur inter-urban competition: if
New York starts doing it, it will probably spread to Albany and Wilmington, and from there to
Boston and Washington D.C. “Indeed to the degree that inter-urban competition becomes more
potent, it will almost certainly operate as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to
bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development. It may even
force repetitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development (such as the serial
reproduction of “world trade centers” or of new cultural and entertainment centers, of waterfront
development, of postmodern shopping malls, and the like).”46
As his personal case study, Harvey offers Baltimore and the (in)famous Harborplace. In
1978, a referendum that almost did not pass opened up city land for private development, which
eventually became Harborplace under the guidance of Mayor William Donald Schaefer, who
later went on to become the governor of Maryland. Harborplace is currently home to the
National Aquarium, various retail stores and chain restaurants. The project has resulted in a
“radical reconstruction of the image of Baltimore,” and even put it on the front cover of Time
Magazine, despite the fact of “increased impoverishment and overall urban deterioration.”47
While the project did bring development money into the city (and increased property values near
the port), it is unclear whether the city has lost more in risk absorption.48
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Interestingly enough, Harvey concludes his paper on an optimistic note, suggesting that
the coalitions and alliances created by the ethos of entrepreneurial urban governance might be
transformed into “a progressive urban corporatism”49 to function as a force of local resistance
against space-based exploitative development. In a paper almost two decades later, however, he
would confess that “the social movements are not strong enough or sufficiently mobilized to
force through.”50

1.3: Neoliberal Urbanism
Little could Harvey know that his scholarly intervention would give birth to a whole
different focus in urban studies, that is, how neoliberalism interacts with urban structures. While
Harvey does not use the word “neoliberalism,”51 he does count much stronger appeal to market
rationality as a primary reason for the rise of entrepreneurial urban governance, which is, as
discussed above, in the core of neoliberal ideology.
Theodore, Peck and Brenner argue that “cities have become strategically important
arenas for neoliberal forms of creative destruction.”52 This is because cities have high population
and capital densities, which results in high cooperative potential53, making them “key arenas (if
not targets) for neoliberal rollback strategies.”54 Cities are also fit to be the spaces for neoliberal
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rollouts because they are “loci for innovation and growth… zones of devolved governance and
local institutional experimentation.”55 The development of entrepreneurial forms of urban
governance in the face of the global tide of neoliberalism is then not a surprise. What is more
interesting, however, is that such neoliberal urbanism has progressively further emphasized its
class character by evolving from a relatively simple promotion of “market-driven capitalist
growth” (which was the case in the 1980s) to “the establishment of new flanking mechanisms
and modes of crisis displacement, in order to insulate powerful economic actors from endemic
failures in markets and governance regimes”56 (starting in the 1990s). Entrepreneurial urban
governance does not simply mean the urban promotion of entrepreneurship and competition. It
also refers to a privileging and protecting of capitalists and landowners, in alignment with the
class character of neoliberal ideology.57 Here is Theodore et al.’s list of creative and destructive
moments in neoliberal urbanism:
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The list gives a rather clear sense of who wins and who loses under neoliberal urbanism. Welfare
becomes workfare –– mandatory work requirements are implemented for welfare provision, and
that’s when there is welfare provision. The global and local business elite gets to hijack the
conversation around local development, representing their own interests. Speculative real-estate
development is not only allowed, but encouraged, often in working class neighborhoods. In the
meanwhile, zones of deregulation are set up to accommodate global capital. Gated communities
and spaces of elite consumption arise, but those who are outside them are subjected to intensified
social control and surveillance in the name of order. “Dangerous classes” out –– moneyed
classes in. It turns out, then, that neoliberal urbanism aims to recreate the city for the capitalist
and the landowner at the expense of the worker, who needs to fight back to carve himself a place
in the city.

1.4: Criticisms of the Thesis
As expected with such overarching claims, dissenters abound. Pinson and Journel
summarize the general objections to the neoliberalism thesis under four categories: definitional,
descriptive, analytical, and normative.59
The definitional objection is that many people who work with the term do not have a
clear idea of what it really is, which becomes a serious problem when “neoliberalization” is
being used to explain social phenomena like an independent variable. Sometimes the definitions
are so wide that they can be used to describe and explain almost anything. Given that a working
definition of neoliberalism is provided earlier in this project, however, this is not a worry here.
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Those who object to the descriptive capacity of the thesis question whether the theory
actually matches the reality: is this really what has been happening for the past three to four
decades? Pinson and Journel suggest that, “in many cities and countries, there has been no such
thing as a complete and systematic reorientation of national or urban policies along more
competitive and market-friendly paradigms.”60 In France, for example, some cities have
countered gentrification by implementing mandatory social housing stock laws. This may be
because forces of neoliberal urbanism have collided with forces of Rawlsianism and new visions
of social democracy. There is also the problem of periodization: the French (business-friendly
dirigisme) and British (British Urban Development Corporations) examples suggest that capitalfriendly restructurings were also taking place in the 1950s, right after World War 2. Similarly,
the reorientation of capital from industrial towards real-estate investments has been taking place
before the 1970s in Italy and Spain. To this objection I will simply answer that the Turkish
experience of neoliberalism has been rather mainstream, and it fits the theory nicely for the most
part, which may be the case because of the close political and economic alliances between
Turkey and the United States in the post-war era.
The analytical objections are fourfold: (1) neoliberalism is being seen as a supercause
that can explain many things that are most likely not related, (2) scholars of neoliberalism pay
little attention to local context and opposing forces, (3) they pay too much attention to the power
of ideas and not enough to real tangible socioeconomic conditions, and (4) they have a skewed
understanding of social change: “Political, social, economic and spatial change does not
necessarily occur by virtue of ideas, long-term plans or political enterprises. It also happens
through pragmatic and improvised adaptations to new issues, problems, opportunities,
technologies, resources, mobilizing available cognitive schemes and policy instruments.” (1) is a
60
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valid objection: it is hard to counter the inert tendency to designate a supercause to explain an
ever-expanding universe of phenomena that seem to be related –– this project will attempt to
counter that (and [2]) by highlighting other influences in Turkey, such as the military and the rise
of authoritarianism and Islamism within Turkey. In response to (3) and (4), I would like to
highlight the following: it is in a fairly neoliberalized world economy that local actors have to
respond to various issues, at least some of which are caused by the tide of neoliberalization
surrounding them. Pragmatic deliberations and improvisations can result in neoliberal outcomes.
In fact, it might be quite pragmatic for some local actors to adopt a neoliberal approach to their
issues if the communities they end up having to compete against are being neoliberalized
themselves, as not doing so might prescribe ruin (i.e., Harvey’s contagion effect). Pinson and
Journel are definitely right that local actors might not at all think about neoliberalism while
advocating for their communities, but I would argue that the fact that the agents do not start from
a neoliberal standpoint does not mean that the point at which they arrive cannot be a neoliberal
one.
The normative objection is twofold: scholars are not generous enough in identifying the
positive aspects of recent social changes, on which progressive forces could potentially build,
and they do not offer any cure or alternative to the hegemony of neoliberalism, if such hegemony
actually exists. This will be addressed in the conclusion, where I point to a possible alternative.
Maybe the only thing I have to say is that most of these objections are not completely
applicable to this project, which is much more conservative in its aims and ambitions: here I
simply attempt to show that Istanbul and Antalya have become/are becoming more and more
neoliberalized by highlighting some recent developments.
Before that, however, let us take ↓
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Chapter 2: A Detour to Turkish “Economic” History

It is rather easy to point out the date on which Turkey entered its own neoliberal era:
January 24, 1980, when the government signed an IMF-backed reform package.61 Talks of
serious economic liberalization within the government had been taking place at least since
197762 and the process would continue for at least another decade, but the Decisions of January
24 (which is how the reform package is publicly known) are generally accepted to be the turning
point for the Turkish economy. These decisions, however, were decidedly harsh, and only after
the right-wing coup63 eight months later on September 12, 1980, could they be implemented as
desired. Here I find my way to that point in Turkish history, starting with an overview of the
Ottoman economy, and going period by period till year 1980.

2.1: The Last Days of The Ottoman Economy
The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922/23) was an Islamic Empire that extended, at its peak,
all the way from the walls of Vienna to the place where the Red Sea opens to the Indian Ocean,
but its size was disproportionate to its long-term economic success and innovative capacity:
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while Europe was going through various stages of industrial revolutions and starting to develop
capitalist structures, the Ottoman Empire, reliant on war loot and agricultural tax revenue, was
stuck with its war-dependent feudalistic ways. The government, for example, would lease land to
those who agreed to “farm” tax for the state, a practice that transformed over time into an odd
but predictable variant of rentierism:
Tax farms (iltizams) increasingly became indistinguishable from private property (mülk)
and a new influential class grew on the land. This landed gentry commonly called ayan
(or at times derebeyi), interposed itself between the government and the peasantry, and
intercepted much of the State's rural income. The members of this new class were in
theory only lessees, but the central government's weakness and its need for immediate
revenue enabled the ayan not only to raise the amount of taxes they collected to an
exorbitant level, but also to secure their positions by expropriating the functions of
government in the provinces.64

The empire at large, however, could never go capitalist or modernize, partially because it never
had its own industrial revolution. Egilmez argues that this was a result of its religious allergy to
natural sciences, 65 but a more nuanced account of the matter by Ekmelettin Ihsanoglu states that
“the Ottomans’ interest [in science] was oriented towards practical ends and the application of
scientific theories, while the three main aspects of modern Western science, namely theory,
research, and experiment were not taken into consideration.”66 This would mean that there must
be some reason other than a lack of knowledge for the absence of an industrial revolution in the
Empire. The inflow of cheap manufactured goods from abroad might be one such reason,67 and
the simple incompetency of the imperial government another. Or maybe, the rise of rentierism
might have pretended the farmers from accumulating savings that would have become capital.
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Neither did the Ottoman Empire have a well-developed financial sector, so it was not
directly affected by the Long Depression (1873-1879) that hit many European economies hard.
However the government had been borrowing money from several European states to finance its
operations (starting with the Crimean War of 1854), and now that those debtees were in tough
fiscal positions, they started to demand immediate payments. The Ottoman government was
already late on its payments due to the drought in 1873-1874 which had diminished agricultural
revenues. The result was the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u
Umumiye), an institution by which the European governments took control of the Ottoman fiscal
matters.68
Other factors that contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the point that it
would be called the sick man of Europe69 include rampant state corruption and the capitulations
that the Ottoman government would grant to foreign governments and non-Muslims liberally.
Capitulations are economic privileges related mostly to trade but also to the right of use of
Ottoman waterways, granted with the hope that they can stimulate the home economy. While
they were initially formulated as exchanges (i.e., the government would grant privileges and the
receiving country would pay taxes), as time proceeded, the government started handing them out
for free. The first capitulation was granted to the Republic of Ragusa in 1365, and the last one
would be a renewal of all prior capitulations with the Treaty of Sérves in 1920, signed after
World War I by the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers. This treaty would be abandoned,
however, when the Turkish national movement led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938, first
president of the Republic of Turkey) won the Turkish War of Independence and established a
new republic in 1923, bringing the Allied Powers back to the bargaining table. The result of
68
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those negotiations was the Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the Republic of Turkey as a
sovereign country and ended the war.

2.2: Liberal Policies Period (1923-1929)70
The socioeconomic situation taken over from the Ottomans by the infant Republic was
grim: low income per capita, low literacy rates (10 percent in 189771), a powerful landowning
class, no industry, post-war exhaustion (two wars, to be more precise), lack of natural resources,
and no culture of research and development. They also had to repay two-thirds of the Ottoman
debt, which took three decades. All of the aforementioned capitulations were lifted with the
Treaty of Lausanne, but according to the trade agreement signed a year after Lausanne, the
Ottoman tariff system of 1916, which had made the empire an exports dump, had to be kept in
place for a five year period, preventing the government from supporting the new industries that
could benefit from trade protection.72
In response to this situation, the “national-liberal”73 economic doctrine of the Republic
was expounded during the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923, where delegates of various interest
groups voiced their demands. Fitting the label “national,” no invitation was extended to the
minority trade groups (non-Muslim, Armenian, Jewish, et cetera; mostly located in Istanbul), and
many labor and small farm delegates could not make it to Izmir, a city that is to the westernmost
of the country,74 due to travel costs. The non-binding decisions announced as a result of the
congress included the removal of asar (a direct tax on agricultural products, abhorred by
70
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practically all groups; removed in 1925), a shift from an estimated profit tax to an income tax
(accomplished), the establishment of banks with the explicit aim of helping the private sector
(Isbank 2014, and 29 more banks between 1923 and 1927), and the granting of basic labor rights
(the right to unionize,75 8-hour workday, 1 day vacation per week). Significantly enough, no
talks of a land reform or a right to strike took place during the congress.76 The Turkish
government passed The Law for the Promotion of Industry in 1927, and started to establish SOEs
to provide the private sector with raw materials (extractive industries) and an educated labor
force (job training, schooling). The state would also fill in when the private sector slacked. This
quasi-liberal attitude would continue until the Great Depression of 1929, when the government
would decide to take the reins. Egilmez describes the economic approach of the period as “open
for trade, incentivizing industrialization at home, and attempting to foster economic growth, with
fiscal policy being utilized heavily.”77

2.3: State-Run War Economy and Statism (1930-1949)
Because the Turkish economy also got hit by the Great Depression and the private sector
did not flourish as expected, the government decided to step in. The Central Bank of Turkey was
established in 1930, enabling the government to print money and utilize monetary policy. The
Law on the Protection of the Value of Lira was also passed in 1930, resulting in the adoption of a
fixed-rate exchange regime. Sumerbank was established in 1933 to fund investments in the
textile industry, and the government for the first time determined an interest rate. Under the First
5-Year Industrial Plan (1934-38), the government attempted to set up production facilities in five
sectors: textiles, mining, pulp and paper, chemicals, and soil. The plan cost around 100 billion
75
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liras, and some of it was funded with Soviet loans. While the plan was not fully successful, it
provided educational opportunities for Turkish engineers and workers, and built the foundational
infrastructure for further investments in these fields.
The Second 5-Year Industrial Plan (1939-44) was supposed to build on the limited
success of the former one, but could never be enacted, as World War II broke out. Turkey did
abstain from the war, but still had to mobilize as if they might need to join, given the geopolitical
circumstances. The National Prevention Law passed in 1940 enabled the government to assign
prices to goods and services and levy heavy fines on black market operations. Two years later,
the government enacted a wealth tax that primarily targeted minorities, again in line with the
nationalist economic attitude of the time that wanted to create a Muslim-Turk business class to
replace the Christian Armenian, Christian Greek, and Jewish businesspeople. The prime minister
of the time, Sukru Saracoglu, would comment on it as being “a revolutionary law. We have the
opportunity to achieve our economic liberation. By removing the foreigners who are in control of
our economy, we will give [the Turkish economy] to the hands of the Turks.”78
On March 11, 1947, Turkey joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
A day after that, President Truman of the US delivered a speech to the Congress that would
provide the basis of what is now known as The Truman Doctrine. The core of the doctrine was
that the US had a moral obligation and a strategic rationale “to assist ‘free peoples’ in their
struggles against ‘totalitarian regimes.’”79 Because the British had decided to stop helping both
Greece and Turkey, he argued, the US should support the Greek government in its civil war
against the Greek Communist Party, and also provide aid to Turkey which was now in a fragile

78

Cited in Alpay et al., pp. 73. Alpay proceeds to explain the dirty journalism that attacked the minorities for not
being “core-Turks,” for (supposedly) not having spilled blood for the land, for (supposedly) robbing those who did
spoil blood, and so forth.
79
Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945-1952 –– The Truman Doctrine,” Last accessed on 10/20/2019

31
position. If the Greek government were to lose the civil war, Turkish political stability could also
be under threat, which could give way to a new destructive whirlpool in the Middle East. More
significantly, it was in the United States’ best interest (“national security” and “international
peace”) to curb communism and the Soviet zone of influence, and both Turkey80 and Greece
proved to be prone to such “attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures.”81 The result was $300 million to Greece and $100 million to Turkey in monetary aid,
plus weaponry, ammunition and personnel. And the beginning of the Cold War.
The Truman Doctrine opened the path for the Marshall Plan82 of 1948, a collection of aid
packages for the war-ridden countries of Europe to help their economies get back on their feet,
and also to disrupt and limit Soviet expansionism. It would help to create a united European
economy that would counter the Soviet bloc. 16 European countries, including Turkey, received
aid under this plan, totalling $12 billion. The Conference of European Economic Co-operation
(later Organisation for Economic Co-opeartion andDevelopment, [OECD]) was set up to monitor
how the aid funds were used. While Turkey was initially not considered for the plan because it
never fought in the war, fears of Soviet influence convinced the US to give Turkey $314 million,
which, however, would be used in rather specific ways: the government was asked to shift a
considerable amount of investment from heavy industry83 to military, mining, and agricultural
mechanization,84 designating Turkey as one of the major food and raw materials suppliers of the
world within this new American-led division of international labor85 –– a designation that, Emre
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Alkin points out, failed to materialize in the long run.86 What is important to realize, however, is
that with the Marshall Plan, no matter how successful it was, the American economic and
financial hegemony in the European sphere (including Turkey) was firmly established.87 This
hegemony also had a cultural extension to it: “The 1968 generation in Turkey grew up within the
context of the Marshall Plan. During their 10-minute ‘long breaks’ in elementary school, they
were fed milk made out of American powdered milk, fish oil tablets, and orange-colored cheese
from cans… Interestingly enough, half of that generation grew up to oppose American policies,
and the other half became avid American supporters.”88
In the middle of all of this, the Turkish government started to consider transforming the
farmers without land into property owners. This was a major shift from the attitude towards the
big landowners. The government had redistributed some public and private land in the 1920s, but
mostly in the eastern provinces, and mostly in the areas where rebellions were common. It was
more than anything a political move. In the 1930s, however, both Ataturk and Ismet Inonu89
started to talk publicly about the need to make sure all farmers possess land. In an attempt to
curb the pro-private property stance of the 1924 Constitution, it was amended in 1937 that the
government did not have to pay the market price of the land in the case of a condemnation for
public use, but a separate law would determine the price of the said property. It would take an
extra eight years to pass the Law to Make Farmers Landowners (1945) due to World War II and
the harsh opposition to the policy. The targets of redistribution were government lands that were
underutilized or not used at all, lands with no known owner, and lands owned by big landowners,
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with the aim of phasing out the pseudofeudal relationships caused by the unequal ownership of
land. One particularly radical section of the law allowed for the condemnation and redistribution
of the land above 50 decares90 that was farmed by tenants and not the owner, but that radicalism
proved to be short-lived: a law package announced right before the 1950 election made it almost
impossible to condemn privately owned land for the purpose of redistribution. In the 28-year
long lifespan of the Law to Make Farmers Landowners, only 54 thousand decares of land owned
by private persons were condemned for redistribution, a mere one-third of the 154 thousand
decares condemned, and a tiny portion of the 22 million decares redistributed in total (most of it
government land). Nevertheless, the opposition would not forget these politics of the founders’
party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). They would constitute the Democrat Party and win
the second multiparty elections in 195091 by a landslide.92

2.4: Back to (Quasi-)Liberal Policies (1950-1960)
The Democrat Party (DP) came to power partly as a reaction to the state planning of the
previous period that threatened the interests of businesspeople and landowners. Correspondingly,
the DP attempted to “liberalize” the economy and attract foreign capital. Subsidies were set up to
further mechanize agriculture, which was partially the cause of the rural-to-urban migration that
started in this period, as agricultural jobs were slowly disappearing. Imports were restricted to
protect domestic industries that still needed to grow to be able to compete in world markets.
Credit opportunities were increased and the money supply was expanded. But it was also in this
period (in 1952) that a national labor union coalition (aided by anti-communist American and
European unionists) was established.
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During this period, the government also abandoned its previous93 focus on railways as the
primary means of transportation, and started to invest heavily in highways and roads. This was to
a great extent a result of the Marshall Plan: the US was recommending the aid-receiving
countries to build more road/highway based transportation systems, and such investments were
supported by the Marshall Plan. In Turkey, this shift was suggested by H.E Hilts, a US deputy
commissioner, in a 1947 report, and the government accepted it happily and started the work in
1948. By 1960, the majority of the country was covered with asphalt roads, providing all-season
access. This suggestion by the Americans, however, was not simply a matter of efficiency: the
American automotive and petroleum industries were quite clear with their preferences.94 The
same point is also made by Emre Alkin, who blames the foreign domination of the Turkish
automotive market for the lack of high-quality Turkish automotive companies.95
The pogrom of September 6 and 7, 1955, can only be characterized as a wave of terror
against ethnic minorities (mostly Greek), who were already explicitly targeted with the wealth
law of 1942. In response to the (fake) news of a bomb explosion at Ataturk’s house of birth in
Thessaloniki, Greece, Turkish nationalists got together in Beyoglu and other minority-inhabited
areas in Istanbul to attack shops, houses, newspapers, and other minority-owned establishments.
In Izmir, the Greek Consulate was arsoned. At least 30 people died in Istanbul. The result, in
addition to the horrible stain on the Turkish conscience and the loss of innocent lives and
property, was the exodus of even more minorities from Istanbul and Turkey, further harming the
cosmopolitan character of the city.96
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While the economy was faring well for the first half of the decade, a bloated money
supply coupled with a shortage of major goods and services resulted in high rates of inflation,
averaging 15 percent from 1954 to 1959. The agricultural production was stalling due to a lack
of access to spare parts and a drought. As the export performance started to fall, Turkey’s foreign
currency reserves started to diminish, making it infeasible to import oil, further hurting the
economy. And there were of course debts to pay too, which the government could not do. As a
result, in 1958, Turkey announced its bankruptcy and asked the IMF for a new deal to pay its
debt worth $422 million. Turkey then had its first currency devaluation and started to import
more goods to fix the price imbalance between the domestic and foreign markets. The credit
sector was also regulated.97 What ended the Democrat Party rule, however, was not the people
condemning the nightmarish economic performance and voting them out, but a coup by a certain
group within the military outside the chain of command that was, Egilmez claims, fed up with
the American economic hegemony that started with the Marshall Plan of 1947. The more
conventional narratives of the 1960 coup emphasize the repressive and authoritarian turn in the
DP politics as the coup’s raison d’etre, and describe the Constitution of 1961 as the most
democratic one in the history of Turkey.98 The Workers’ Party of Turkey, for example, managed
to put representatives in the parliament with the elections in 1961, and CHP, which barely won
the elections, was transformed by the presence of such leftist forces in the parliament during their
four-year rule.
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2.5: Mixed Economy (1961-1979)
In addition to granting inalienable rights to the citizens (which were simply legal rights in
the previous constitution, hence overridable), the Constitution of 1961 re-established the Turkish
state as a welfare state responsible for the socioeconomic well-being of its citizens, and adopted
the principle of state planning as a means for that end.99 The State Planning Organization (DPT)
was already founded before the constitutional referendum. The first five-year development plan
started in 1963 and aimed for an annual 7 percent growth rate with import substitution
industrialization. Some prices were still determined by the government. Similar plans would be
used throughout this period. While these plans prescribed what the public sector must do, they
functioned more as sets of guiding principles for the private sector, as subsidies and other sorts
of support depended on the private firms’ adherence to the goals of the plan. Non-adherence was
not penalized. In addition to industrialization (the first Turkish car to be sold, Anadol, was
produced in 1966), this period also started to see the rise of service sectors in the country. The
Social Security Law was passed in 1965.
One corollary of the rural-to-urban migration that took off in the 1950s was the rise of the
gecekondu, “put-overnight,” referring to the ramshackle houses and apartments mostly built on
state-owned land by those who could not afford housing otherwise. Throughout the 1950s, the
inhabitants were promised land licences and infrastructural investments by various politicians for
political clout, further incentivizing gecekondu neighborhoods. When the Constitution of 1961
made the government responsible for providing social housing for low-income families, but
budget constraints made that impossible, the government stuck to its decision of turning a blind
eye to the rise of these illegal developments, well aware of the political cost that would arise

99

Szyłiowicz, Joseph S., “THE 1961 TURKISH CONSTITUTION—AN ANALYSIS.” Islamic Studies, vol. 2, no.
3, 1963, pp. 369-370

37
from cracking down. The presence of these low-income families in major cities such as Istanbul,
Ankara, Izmir, and Adana was desirable also because they provided cheap labor, a balancing
force to the expensive import of technology due to the (persisting) lack of R&D in the country.100
In the 1960s, however, the gecekondu phenomenon evolved from being need-based to being
speculative and rentier-like. A whole underground real estate sector developed in gecekondu
neighborhoods, with the current residents arranging land for the rural newcomers and building
apartment blocks to collect rent themselves. In 1966, the Justice Party (JP) government (the
follow-up to DP; won the 1965 elections), passed the Gecekondu Law, acknowledging that there
is a gecekondu problem that should be addressed by preventing such developments in the future
and incorporating the existing gecekondu zones into the larger city via modern urban planning.
While the law did not result in much action (in fact, it acknowledged the gecekondu as a legally
valid form of residential arrangement, as local municipalities kept transferring land to illegal
developers), it set the basis for the storm of urban renewal that would swell in the 1980s.101
Partially as a result of the democratic space created by the Constitution of 1961, and in
alignment with the global 1968 generation, the second half of the 1960s saw the organization of
socialist-communist and anti-American forces in the country, especially on college campuses
such as Ankara University, Middle Eastern Technical University, and Istanbul Technical
University. In reaction to these groups, students and young people with conservative, religious,
and nationalist leanings organized against what they saw as communistic infidelity. Their clashes
became violent (bombings, killings; anarchic terror), and seeing that the conflict was not going to
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cease on its own, the military ordered the JP government to step down in 1971.102 While the coup
of 1960 had brought left-leaning generals to power, the coup of 1971 did the exact opposite,
giving the steering wheel to right-wing forces and shelving the democratic environment created
in 1961 –– constitutional amendments that criminalized dissent, the forced dissolution of The
Workers’ Party of Turkey, tortures in the Ziverbey Villa, et cetera. The economic background to
all of this was the IMF-induced stability decisions of August 10, 1970, when the currency was
devalued again, the prices of sugar and petroleum were increased, and the interest rates were
increased for the first time since 1960. The culprit, again, was increasing foreign debt paired with
diminishing foreign currency reserves. The IMF, again, was suggesting liberalization, trade and
otherwise.103
After two years of brutal authoritarianism and martial law, the CHP of Bulent Ecevit won
the elections in 1973, but had to create a coalition with Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation
Party. Another attempt at land reform in 1973 failed (again), as the Supreme Court nulled the law
upon the JP’s request in 1976. The most significant undertaking of this coalition was the Cyprus
operation in 1974, which was condemned universally and brought on an economic embargo
against Turkey. The direct result was a shortage of goods and the rise of black markets (again).
Equally detrimental for the oil-dependent economy was the 1973-74 OAPEC oil crisis –– rising
production costs, increasing trade deficit, reduction in remittances from the Turkish workers
abroad (mostly in Germany and the Netherlands), resulting in inflation of 28 percent in 1977,
47.2 percent in 1978, and 56.8 percent in 1979. Combined with the political reality of right-wing
groups becoming even more violent, epitomized in the assassinations of left-wing and liberal
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figures by the Grey Wolves, a far-right ultranationalist group,104 another coup was practically
inevitable. But first, the Decisions of January 24.

2.6: The Reform, The Coup, The Immediate Aftermath (1980-)
During one of his many short tenures as the prime minister of Turkey (this specific tenure
being from November 12, 1979 to September 12, 1980, the day on which the coup took place),
Suleyman Demirel asked his undersecretary (and later prime minister and president) Turgut Ozal
to design a stability and austerity plan to put the Turkish economy back in order. The result was
the Decisions of January 24, an IMF-backed orthodox plan that included the following:105
devaluation (again); daily flexible exchange rate system; elimination of all subsidies (except
those for energy, transportation, and soil); cancelling of the governmental wholesale purchase of
agricultural surplus; trade liberalization (IMF: “finally”); price liberalization; incentivization of
foreign direct investment by easing the restrictions on profit transfers; (temporary[!]) suspension
of unions; privatization of state enterprises, properties, and utilities; and establishment of
subsidies for export-oriented industries.106 In other words, Turkey switched from a primarily
state-planned protectionist economy to an export-oriented and seemingly pro-market economy,
open for global business, a switch the magnitude of which is impossible to overestimate. In
adherence to the neoliberal ideology, the Turkish economy was restructured to be more friendly
to the tenets of competition, domestically and internationally, the historical corollary of such
restructuring being a collaboration with global capital against local labor.
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That the coup of September 12, 1980, was partially in response to the left-right political
chaos in the country is generally accepted. Some commentators, however, insist that the coup
took place primarily to implement the Decisions, to which the public opinion was not hospitable.
Ozdemir Ince, for example, points out that it was Turgut Ozal who designed the plan, was
responsible for economic affairs during the military government (1980-1983), and became the
prime minister as a result of the 1983 elections.107 Either way, it is clear that the generals
supported the Decisions and facilitated the successful unfolding of its policies. For example, the
constitution of 1982108 was sneakily anti-labor: it acknowledged the right to lockout109 of
employers who are trying to negotiate with their employees, putting it on the same level with the
right to strike. It also allowed the government to prevent a strike for “national security” reasons.
A 1983 amendment to the corresponding law redefined the rules surrounding strike
postponements: if a strike is delayed for more than sixty days, it can no more be continued, and
the workers must negotiate with their employers or go to the higher court110 that takes care of
such disputes, which is a tedious process with no definite outcome. The perversity of the
regulation comes from the fact that it is the Council of State that issues postponements and the
end of them, which means that the workers are captive to the state. Correspondingly, as one
commentator put it in a labor-friendly newspaper, “the constitutional right to strike is a farce, a
deception.”111 (To cite a more scholarly voice, “the income distribution after 1980 became
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forever skewed in favor of the industrial elites as previous unionization efforts were destroyed,
leaving no chance for wage negotiations under the more restricted 1982 Constitution.”112)
And it goes without saying that the IMF-WB-OECD trio had enormous influence on the
Turkish government, because the state was (again) drowning in foreign debt. Ozal’s program had
to adhere to their recommendations, because Turkey owed them and needed to borrow more
from them to save the economy. In Dr. Bilsay Kuruc’s words, “this is how financial capital
works. When they lend you money, they will want to guarantee that you pay them back, and
decide on the rules themselves. With the January 24 decisions, we declare ourselves
bankrupt.”113 The last two decades of the century were a financial fiasco. Ozal believed that he
could bring enough foreign currency in if he just incentivized exports enough, which did not
work out because Turkish industries were not well-developed and exported low-value goods. In
response, he liberalized the capital accounts fully in 1989 –– which, according to John
Williamson, is one of the primary policy tools of neoliberalism114 –– hoping that it would bring
more currency in, and bring it did, because “while the interest rate abroad for dollar was 3
percent, it was 30 percent in Turkey.”115 The sudden influx of foreign capital was costly, because
(1) the economy became dependent on foreign investment (the flight of foreign capital in the
face of political and economic instability resulted in bankruptcy in 2001), (2) the yield for the
government bonds was simply too high (the government had overestimated its capacity to raise
revenue), and (3) the influx of foreign capital unleashed unproductive gains all throughout the
economy, the prime example of which was the gains made via arbitrage by Turkish banks. After
the 1994 currency crisis, privatization with the specific aim of raising funds to repay foreign debt
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took off. And the bankruptcy of 2001 resulted in what was just too similar to 1980: new crisis,
new IMF reform.
Relying on foreign financial capital to fix the economy, and then becoming victim to the
policies prescribed by foreign capital designed to uphold the interests of foreign capital –– the
parallels to the last days of the Ottoman Empire are nightmarish.

2.7: Three Speculative Theses on 20th-Century Turkey
1) The Turkish state has always been an active one. Even during its most liberal periods, it
arguably has been interventionist. The coups might have also resulted in some sort of
acceptance of the powerful (ab)using their power.116 There might be some sort of a path
dependence on such authoritarian governmental norms and attitudes, which would mean
that the Turkish state of 1980 was well-equipped to perform the role of a neoliberal state
that exhibited “permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention.”117
2) Despite being an active one, however, the Turkish state has consistently failed to counter
the landowning class (e.g. the chronic failure of land redistribution, and the political and
legal giveaways to landowners) and been mostly in cahoots with the nationalist-capitalist
class (for example, the attempt to replace the non-Muslim bourgeoisie with a MuslimTurk one, and the five-year plans of even the most leftist period of the country only being
“recommendations” for the private sector). With the exception of the 1960s, it has been
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the labor that suffered the most in the hands of the Turkish state. It should therefore not
be surprising that the state turned such blatantly anti-labor after the 1980 coup.118
3) Turkey has a long and complicated history with Western governments, especially with
the United States. It has been importing both economic doctrines and cultural frameworks
from the West since its inception, but it has also been puppetereed in alignment with
Western geopolitical and economic interests. The relationship between the West and
Turkey can thus be described as neocolonial, the definition of which I borrow from
Kwame Nkrumah: “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it
is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty.
In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.”119
Correspondingly, the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish state and economy starting in
1980 might just be the logical follow-up to the neoliberal restructuring of the United
States and other major Western countries.

Now, reminder: economies, of course, are in spaces, and exert influences on these spaces. So it
is only natural that this neoliberal turn had an impact on Turkish cities. Unsurprisingly, the prime
example of what neoliberalism did to Turkish cities is Istanbul.
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Chapter 3: Istanbul as a Neoliberal City

When I was born, Istanbul –– considering its relative place in the world –– was going
through its weakest, poorest, remotest and most isolated times in its two-thousand year
long history. Throughout my entire life, the misery caused by the Ottomanite feeling of
demolition, poverty, and the ruins spread all over the city signified Istanbul to me. I spent
my life either fighting this misery, or, like all Istanbulites, accepting it.120

This is the Istanbul of Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk’s 1950s childhood, and his observation is not
without any ground. The Istanbul of the Ottoman Empire was a multinational trade hub that was
well integrated into global economic and cultural networks. As the empire collapsed, so did the
city. While Ataturk’s nationalist movement was fighting for independence and later setting up a
new state with Ankara as its new capital, “the well-to-do non-Muslims and foreign residents of
Istanbul, uneasy under the new regime largely emigrated,” taking the international trade relations
away with them –– and the infant Republic tolerated it, as “in the ethos and nationalist discourse
of the period, Istanbul became the symbolic vestige of decadent Ottoman cosmopolitanism.”121
Financially and populationally strained, the city was something of a phantom until the late 1940s,
when Turkey restructured its economy in accordance with the Marshall plan. Victims to the
mechanization of agriculture, rural masses migrated to large cities such as Istanbul, creating a
cheap labor force. The outskirts saw the rise of large-scale private manufacturing enterprises,
while the inner city experienced “the proliferation of a large number of labor-intensive, smallscale manufacturing and commercial enterprises.”122 Devoid of proper housing, the new migrants
lived in and aided in the rise of gecekondu neighborhoods, and the politicians allowed it, as it
made sense both financially and politically (see 2.5). The overflow of people put extra pressure
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on the city’s infrastructure, about which the national governments in Ankara cared little, as they
were focused on rural politics which was more profitable from a political perspective.123 This
was Pamuk’s decrepit Istanbul of the 50s, 60s, and 70s.
Things changed in the 1980s. Having entered its own neoliberal era, Turkish economy
needed to be restructured according to the logic of domestic and international competition, and it
did not take long for the Motherland Party (ANAP; the post-coup government) of Turgut Ozal to
realize that Istanbul had what it takes to become a hub of competition and accumulation: cheap
labor, relative presence of local capital, land to sprawl into, and a historical-cultural heritage that
can easily by capitalized on. As Keyder and Oncu note, in the midst of fiscal austerity and
stability measures, “Istanbul received a major influx of state funding –– for the first time in
Republican history.”124 ANAP’s “urban populism,” as Oncu calls it, supported the urban lower
and middle classes with their entrepreneurial endeavours, a prime example of which was the
legalization of the previous speculative developments in gecekondu areas undertaken by their
own residents, resulting in a sudden influx of wealth. (This move also opened those lands for
later development in the form of urban renewal –– more on that soon.)
A major component of this restructuring at the city level was a 1984 law (Law No. 3030)
that created metropolitan municipalities. Provinces with more than one electoral district were
now considered metropolitan municipalities (MMs). They had enormous organizational power,
and were hierarchically above the individual district municipalities. With the creation of the
MMs, “authority over development issues was transferred from central to local governments.”125

123

Ibid, pp. 395
Ibid, pp. 397
125
Uzun, Nil, “Urban governance in Istanbul,” Análise Social, Vol. 45, No. 197, Urban Governance in Southern
Europe (2010), pp. 762
124

46
The first mayor of Istanbul MM was Bedrettin Dalan, “a person of vision, tenacity, and skill,”126
the co-founder of ANAP with Ozal, and something of a mascot of entrepreneurialism in Turkey.
Famous for saying that he will make the waters of the Golden Horn as blue as his eyes, he
proceeded to “bulldoz[e] the old streets along the shores of the Golden Horn, concret[e] the
Bosphorus and Marmara corniches, throw up new highways lined by monumental middle-class
apartment blocks,”127 invest in the Central Business District in Maslak that was soon surrounded
on both sides by business centers, and build the second bridge over the Bosphorus.128 Approving
of Dalan’s willingness to make the city more attractive, financial capital poured in: during his
five year tenure from 1984 to 1989, at least a dozen international banks opened branches in the
city.129
But more than just financial capital entered the city under Dalan. While some may argue
that the bazaars were a prelude, Turkey did not have a shopping mall at this point. During his
visit to Houston, Texas, Ozal was extremely impressed by The Galleria there, and demanded that
a similar one be built in Istanbul. The result was Galleria Atakoy, opened in September 1988,
and Turkey has not stopped building shopping malls since then, with Istanbul now having around
100 of them.130 Thus a distinctively American type of consumption and competition (between
individual sellers in the mall) was imported to Istanbul. Other examples of such Americanization
include the first McDonalds in 1986 and, later on, the first Burger King in 1995. In alignment
with such globalization –– Westernization, homogenization; ickification –– of the city, tourism
has become to be thought of as an economic driver. The bulldozed Golden Horn was made it into
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a de facto open air museum with its “historical monuments and picturesque old wooden
houses.”131 The tourist, if hesitant to indulge in the local cuisine, could travel for ten minutes
from the Golden Horn to Taksim for a Big Mac.
In the meanwhile, the Mass Housing Fund (MHF) was created to subsidize housing, from
which Istanbul received the most funding. The Housing Development Administration of Turkey
(TOKI) was also established at this time as a planning and project-development agency. The
fund money was dispersed in the form of subsidized credit through the commercial banking
system to incentivize private housing projects –– between 1984 and 1991, 1080 projects were
thus funded in Istanbul.132 The MHF, however, paved the road for a real estate boom in Istanbul,
with prices in prime locations somehow becoming “comparable to Manhattan levels.”133 Keyder
and Oncu give two reasons for this development: (1) one could sell undeveloped land, the prices
of which were already rising due to speculation, to the MHF for profit, pushing the real estate
and land prices further up, as there was a ready buyer in the market now, and (2) the rising real
estate (and land) prices made it harder for people to buy or rent apartments, which resulted in the
creation of MHF-funded housing cooperatives, which built high-rise apartment complexes
around the new highways built by Dalan. The MHF thus also benefited large contractors, which
were already receiving cheap land from the local government.
In other words, the city was building up on multiple dimensions: shopping malls, hotels,
highways, shoreside developments, middle class apartment complexes, and so on. But such rapid
change comes with pains, as globalized growth endangers distribution134 and local culture: “by
the late 1980s, Dalan’s road-building projects were provoking furious resistance in some of the
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new municipalities” which would vote Dalan out in 1989 and elect the Populist Party (SHP), a
“disaster” characterized by corruption, which nevertheless “produced a powerful denunciation of
Dalan’s ‘world-city’ project and gestured towards a more popular-democratic vision.”135 And in
1994, Istanbul elected Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) as its new
mayor.
As Tugal puts it, RP/Erdogan victory “created both panic and euphoria in the city, at the
prospect that… [the] Islamist urban imaginaire would be applied wholesale,” which refers to the
kind of urbanism exhibited, for example, in the neighborhood of Sultanbeyli: a mosque in the
center with the marketplace surrounding it, an architectural modesty (no buildings higher than
the minaret136) that’s harmonious with both nature and the city’s history, an “alcohol-free,
gender-segregated zone.”137 But even Sultanbeyli had given up on its commitments over time,
cutting down forests to spread out and eventually building tall buildings, so it was no surprise
when Erdogan, who initially had tried to Islamize the city but encountered civil and military
opposition, reinvented both himself and the Islamist movement in a more pro-business and proAmerican/European bent, and founded the Justice and Develoment Party (AKP) in 2001. AKP
won the 2002 general elections easily, initiating the age of “moderate Islam” and free-market
conservatism in Turkey. Islamists who were opposing Dalan’s aggressive, secular, and proglobalization urbanism a couple of years ago were now demanding that skyscrapers be built, and
the previously modest religious festivals were now made into spectacles, with concerts and
comedy shows, and with Muslim tourists from all around the Middle East also in attendance. The
rise of what might be called neoliberal Islamic urbanism continued with AKP’s Kadir Topbas
becoming the mayor of Istanbul in 2004, which increased coordination between the central and
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local governments, with the former willing to handle the legal overhauls necessary for the
imagined change in Istanbul. Furthermore, the reader will see that the central government (and
Erdogan specifically) has played a major role in the reimagining of Istanbul during AKP’s local
and central tenures.
During Topbas’ thirteen year long adventure, Istanbul was transformed radically. The
real estate and built-space craze that started with Dalan was brought to a whole different level as
the central government refurbished TOKI as a machine of public-private enterprise that exceeded
its initial mission of low-income housing. Following is a non-exhaustive list138 of the laws
passed for this purpose in the period 2004-2008:
❏ Law No. 5162: TOKI is given the authority to design and develop urban transformation
projects, to claim eminent domain, and to establish partnerships with private companies
❏ Law No. 5273: the Urban Land Office is abolished, and almost 16 thousand acres of land
are given TOKI.
❏ 2007 amendment to Law No. 775: TOKI is allowed to take treasury land for free.
❏ Law No. 5366: major historical conservation sites can now be considered for urban
renewal.
❏ Law No. 5793: TOKI can start a project without the approval of local authorities.
Additionally, in 2012, the AKP government would rid the forest lands’ protections against
commercial use, opening those that lost their “forest status” due to fires or cutting of trees to
development (Law No. 6292), and Law No. 6306 would allow the Ministry of Environment and
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Urbanization and TOKI to designate natural disaster risk areas, which would then be subject to
urban renewal. The highly ambiguous definition of risk areas make the law open to abuse.
The effectiveness and importance of TOKI, which are the results of these legal boosts,
are hard to overemphasize: “TOKI’s share of the housing market rose from 1.1% in 2003 to
18.6% within four years… while the value of its investments at the municipal level reached $11
billion by 2014.”139 To put it in a different way, it is simply impossible to stand somewhere
(anywhere) in Istanbul, turn one’s head a full rotation, and not see a TOKI banner in the vicinity.
One significant difference between Dalan and Topbas has been the criminalization of the
gecekondu. While the former either formalized or turned a blind eye to it, the latter made
building one “punishable by a five-year prison sentence.”140 Gecekondu neighborhoods, some of
which were prime locations,141 became targets of TOKI’s urban renewal projects. Those who
could prove legal property rights could move in to a TOKI-built apartment, while those who
could not were often subject to eviction, often having to find some other periphery of Istanbul
where they could afford rent.142
It is, however, not only housing projects that are popping up here and there. Under the
AKP government, Istanbul has been flooded with megaprojects, some of which are rather hard to
justify. Camlica Mosque, Erdogan’s personal project, was ordered in 2012, cost around $100
million, and was opened earlier this year despite not being completed yet, probably to rally the
voters right before the local elections. The mosque, which has a museum and a library in it, is on
a hill looking over the entire city. It has been criticized for not having a community around it,
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thus not really serving anyone as a mosque traditionally does. An architect would even go as far
to suggest that “its only characteristic is being big and expensive… It will be a mock-up that is a
concrete imitation of its ancestors.”143 A similar project in Taksim –– an old dream of Erdogan
while he was the mayor, which he could not pull off –– was partially justified by Ahmet Misbah
Demircan, the former Beyoglu district mayor and current assistant to the minister of tourism, in
terms of its potential touristic benefits, claiming that the foreigners who come to see the city will
marvel at the building and have a chance to see Islamic art in the mosque’s museum.144
Istanbul’s other megaprojects, some of which are more utilitarian, include: a third bridge
over the Bosphorus which is a public-private partnership in which the government agreed to set
up a revenue guarantee for the firm that will operate the bridge for ten years and then transfer the
bridge back to the government,145 a third airport that will supposedly be the busiest one in the
world once it is fully operational,146 another megamosque in Atasehir (which is a neighborhood
that may or may not become a second financial district in, depending on the completion and
success of the Istanbul Financial Center, a megaproject of its own),147 an underwater tunnel for
the subway, another underwater tunnel for the cars, a web of highways spread over the northern
section of the city, two stadiums (one looking over the Bosphorus), and one of the largest
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shopping malls in Europe (in addition to many other shopping malls of astounding sizes).148 For
the curious, there exists a website cataloguing all such projects: megaprojeleristanbul.com.
Some of these projects have explicit touristic functions (malls like Istinye and Cevahir
cater to high and middle income tourists, respectively), and some others benefit the Istanbulites
greatly (the subway tunnel). All of them nurture Istanbul’s world-city image, making Istanbul, as
one journalist put it, the Paris of the Arab world.149 But let me draw attention to the 3rd airport3rd bridge-Northern Marmara Highway trio to highlight something potentially more sinister.
The northern section of Istanbul near the Black Sea, where this trio is located,150 was for
the most part publicly owned forest land before these projects, and multiple parties opposed the
projects due to the environmental damage they might inflict –– the airport being too near to the
birds' migration routes, increased heat island effect due to deforestation, air and noise pollution,
potential decrease in water resources, and more.151 As one environmental group puts it, however,
the environmental effects of this trio will not be limited to their construction, because “mega
projects will also pioneer the transformation of the region into new usage areas.”152 Remember
that TOKI has the legal authority to expropriate forest land that is no longer seen as a forest as
determined by Law No. 6306, which means that the surrounding lands can now be opened to
development via public-private partnerships. It is already the case that the third airport is being
used as a focal point to build a new city: when completed, it will include “a central innovation
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district, hotels, retail and commercial office space, logistic centers, an expo and convention
center, public space, and metro and high-speed rail connections to Istanbul and beyond.”153
The sinisterness of the entire ordeal does not end with the opening of the entire Northern
Forests to development with a decadent airport and a bridge “with pylons higher than the Eiffel
Tower,”154 which might be an attempt to revitalize a slumped construction sector that kept the
economy afloat for the past decade.155 What’s worse is that TOKI, which will most likely be a
primary actor in the future development of Northern Istanbul, and other government institutions
that are involved with the construction sector (state banks, for example) are prone to corruption.
As Luke Rodeheffer wrote for The Business Insider in December, 2013:
Allegations of sweetheart deals and palm greasing in privatization bids, land sales, and
government tenders have risen as quickly as the new skyscrapers and shopping malls that
now dot Istanbul’s skyline. Businessmen close to the government have been rewarded
with no-bid contracts, while state banks have been pressured to grant well-connected
companies generous loans.
In addition to shady methods of obtaining credit, a number of construction barons close
to the AKP and Erdoğan himself have been sold huge amounts of land, often for projects
that have nothing to do with public housing. Emrullah Turanli, one of the construction
barons arrested, is a case in point.
Turanli is one of a number of businessmen from the Black Sea region who have become
very wealthy under AKP rule: Torunlar GYO, a real estate partnership was founded by
Aziz Torun, one of Erdoğan’s childhood friends, has become Turkey’s wealthiest private
real estate partnership.156

Rodeheffer is talking about the corruption scandal that broke out in 2013. Earlier that year, two
TOKI officials “were charged with extorting bribes and abuse of power,”157 first such event in
TOKI’s history. The December 2013 corruption investigation resulted in the arrests of around 90
people, all of whom were in one way or another connected to the AKP government. In addition
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to the aforementioned Turanli, two more real estate moguls, Ali Ağaoğlu and Osman Ağca, were
also arrested. Erdogan argued that this is the “Deep State” trying to undermine his authority and
success. The judges who brought up the investigations got assigned to other posts and other
judges were told to take care of the corruption case. At the end of an almost one year long
“investigation,” the case got dismissed.158
What remains, however, is TOKI’s well-earned reputation as a “notoriously opaque state
housing agency.”159 To put it even more plainly, Northern Istanbul, once the city’s lungs, is now
open not only for business, but also to be expropriated by Erdogan’s cronies via TOKI and its
legal authority –– which raises the question of whether such crony capitalism is compatible with
neoliberalism as defined here: a way of thinking that finds entrepreneurship and competition to
be the forces through which progress can be achieved. After all, such privileging of a handful of
companies goes directly against the tenets of fair competition, as it gives arbitrary competitive
edge to these companies. In response I recite Theodore et al.’s claim that “we are dealing here
with an uneven, contradictory, and ongoing process of neoliberalization.”160 Turkey, starting
with its Ottoman roots, have suffered from corruption to a not negligible extent, so it is not
surprising that this socioeconomic reality persists despite neoliberalization.161 That being said,
even if competition within Istanbul is being thwarted by the state, Istanbul as a city is being
made to compete with other major cities both in the region and in the world, and is being
restructured to accommodate global and local capital.
And, of course, Istanbul is not alone.
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Chapter 4: Antalya as a Neoliberal City; or, the Redevelopment of Kepez

“I believe that it is a multifaceted trap set for Antalya.” -- a local journalist162

435 miles south of Istanbul sits Antalya on the Mediterrenean, right across from the
northern coast of Cyprus. It has a coastal line of 397 miles (310 of which providing easy access
to the water) and practically no winter –– the seawater is warm enough to swim in from March to
December,163 and the average January temperature is 50 ̊ F.164 In fact, the month of August sees
temperatures above 100 ̊ F regularly, with the locals staying at home under their ACs. Most of
the beaches are sandy, and the views of the Taurus Mountains, the sunsets and the sea cliffs are
regularly splendid. All of this is to say that Antalya is a natural location for coastal tourism.
While the city also benefits from the presence of a ski center nearby and its historical heritage
(Hadrian's Gate and the Roman theatre of Aspendos, for example), the main reason why more
than 12 million tourists have been in Antalya in 2019165 is the good ol’ sun-sea-sand trio.
Antalya’s potential was seen as early as in the 1950s, with the mayor Hasim Iscan trying
to implement a tourism consciousness among the locals. In November 1950, the city was put in
the “First Tourism Development Region,” and the planning for touristic facilities and necessary
infrastructure thus started. The 1950s saw a theater and music festival at the Aspendos theatre,
the opening of the first runway of the airport, the construction of roads connecting different

162

Akkaya, Ibrahim, “Antalya’ya kurulan tuzak,” Akdeniz Gercek, May 17, 2017
“Deniz Turizmi,” Antalya Il Kultur ve Turizm Mudurlugu. Link: https://antalya.ktb.gov.tr/TR-68436/denizturizmi.html
164
“Antalya, Turkey: Annual Weather Averages,” holiday-weather.com
165
“Antalya’da turist sayisi 12 milyonu gecti,” Milliyet, September 17, 2019. In 2018, it was the 11th top tourist
destination in the world. “2018'de dünyanın en çok ziyaret edilen şehirleri belli oldu,” CNNTurk, October 20, 2018
163

57
coastal regions of the province,166 the opening of the first tourism-oriented hotel in the city, and
the construction of bungalows on the Konyaalti beach. These initial attempts were not that
successful: in 1958, only 208 tourists came to the city.167 Nevertheless, they were the first steps
of the long journey that would make the city into a world-class tourism center. Antalya currently
has 407 5-star resorts and 42 percent of the hotel bed capacity in Turkey. To put it in perspective,
Antalya has more 5-star resorts than Spain has.168
Not surprisingly, the real boost to the tourism sector came in the 1980s. The Tourism
Incentivization Law of 1982 enabled the establishment of new tourism zones, reversing the prior
attitude of conservation regarding land use. As Kaan et al. puts it, “investors, who previously had
to deal with 1001 bureucratic obstacles, were relieved when, in 1983, the prime minister [Ozal]
advocated for the ‘chimneyless industry’ as a source of national revenue and designated Antalya
as the location for it.”169 Entrepreneurs were given reductions in VAT and cheap or free land for
hotel construction. The sector’s success henceforth is nothing short of miraculous: while only
4,903 tourists were recorded in 1980, 826,027 tourists were seen in 1990, and almost two million
people visited the city in 1999.170
Add the convention centers, the annual Golden Orange Film Festival, G-20 Summit in
2010, and EXPO 2016 –– with Deep Purple as the headliner –– and you have a city with global
aspirations, catering to international actors. With restaurant menus in three languages (Turkish,
English, Russian) and cabs offering their prices in multiple currencies, it is easy to get caught up
166
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in the world-city image of Antalya, and to an extent, it is impossible to imagine another Antalya:
in 2016, 21 percent of the city’s GDP came from the tourism sector, without competition the
highest rate in the world, with the second highest rate being that of Lisbon, Portugal, a mere 5.3
percent.171 Nevertheless, there is another Antalya that has (or had) little to do with what has been
described so far, where the sea is not even in sight: Kepez.
Before the 1950s, Kepez did not exist. Covered in shrubs and wild strawberry trees, it
was the section through which people exited the city. It was mostly an old Ottoman farm of over
14,000 hectares (Vakif Muratpasa Ciftligi), neglected for almost a century and then, in 1930,
revitalized to grow olives and pistachio trees. In the 1950s, however, some locals successfully
lobbied the government to help them build factories, and they were shown land near the farm. A
textile factory (1955), an electric plant (1955), a ferrochrome factory (1957), a rubber factory
(1964), an oil factory (1969), and a battery factory (1976) opened in its vicinity, jumpstarting the
area’s development. These new factories functioned as pull factors of migration: 1970s onwards,
people from more rural sections of Antalya and from other provinces started moving to Kepez to
find jobs, and in the absence of affordable proper housing, they built gecekondu neighborhoods
on some of the farm land. It was, however, not only these workers who were involved in this
process. Some started to speculate that Kepez would become extremely valuable in the near
future and fenced off tracts of lands, and some others built winter-gecekondus for themselves,
living up in the mountains during the warmer months and coming down when it got too cold.
Paralleling the situation in Istanbul, the government first resisted this development –– they built
walls around the farm, hired guards to report when they saw someone trying to build, but alas: an
underground real estate sector developed in Kepez, with one-family houses being transformed
into multiple-story apartment buildings, and politicians started to promise legalization and land
171
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licenses right before each election. Some people got them, and some others did not. In the end,
Kepez became a district with its own municipality in 1994. As local historian Huseyin Cimrin
put it, “a city was thus born where, before 1970, only those who were going for a long trip could
be seen.”172 Today, more than 500 thousand people live in the district of Kepez.
The neighborhoods of Kepez173 and Santral neighboring the ferrochrome factory are
currently going through what the state calls “the largest urban transformation project in the
country.”174 When concluded, this “new Antalya in Antalya” (sic) will accommodate more than
70 thousand people, with 17000 residential units and 2000 stores, home offices and other multiuse spaces. It will have “hospitals, educational institutions, shopping malls, commercial centers,
a large city park, a museum, and a technocity,” that is, “in short everything a city needs” (sic).
The project has an investment value of 8 billion Turkish liras (around $1.4 billion), “making
Antalya an important city of life and investment in the future, just as it is today” (sic).175
This monumental project is being handled by Sur Yapi, an Istanbul-based real estate
developer and one of the most dominant ones in the market: one of every 15 Istanbulites works
in an office building built by them.176 Sur Yapi easily won the 2017 open auction for the right to
do the project, as the only other firm withdrew from the auction without bidding. While the thenmayor of the Antalya Metropolitan Municipality, Menderes Turel of AKP, bragged about how
transparent and open the entire process was, highlighting how they did not have a legal
obligation to have an open auction but had it nevertheless,177 the entire ordeal reeks of corrupt
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alliances: Sur Yapi volunteered to build the Taksim Mosque, Erdogan’s failed mayoral
aspiration, saying that they will do it “for the love of God,”178 and Altan Elmas, the owner of
Suryapi, claimed during an interview on the Antalya project that “the world’s dominant powers
are trying control us… and for the past 15 years they have been trying to make our President
[Erdogan] pay [for resisting them]. He is giving the biggest fight.”179 During the 2016 failed
coup attempt, Elmas e-mailed 500 of his Sur Yapi employees to go on the streets to resist the
soldiers, he himself taking to the streets with his three brothers, and claimed after the coup that
Erdogan is the person who keeps this country together like “that piece of a tespih (imame) that
keeps the praying beads together.”180

Rumor 1: “Menderes Turel got a good deal out of it, he has 50 units, 50!”

One obvious question is that of “why” –– that is, why Kepez and why now? The easy
answer given by the government is a combination of countering “unhealthy urbanization” and
getting ready for a possible earthquake. As Turel put it in one of the many pamphlets printed in
relation with the project, “to counter unhealthy urbanization and create safe, high quality and
inhabitable spaces, we need to refine, renew, and improve disaster prone areas.”181 In fact, it was
the above-mentioned Law No. 6306 (about risk areas and urban renewal) that was invoked to
legally justify the project. Recent research suggests that Antalya is disaster prone: a 2011 paper
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claims that the chance of a destructive earthquake (of a minimum magnitude of 6.5) happening in
the following fifty years is 15 percent.182
There exists, however, other reasons why Kepez must have been seen fit for a $1.4 billion
investment. While the sea is indeed not in sight, it takes only 15 minutes to drive to the closest
beach, Konyaalti Beach, which recently got renovated. Beach Park, a semi-private area of
Konyaalti, which had been in a poor state for many years, is now home to many restaurants and
beach clubs, and a dozen almost identical coffee shops with card games and hookah, waiting for
a microeconomist to study them as a real-life case of perfect competition. Previously in 2009,
Kepez was connected to the larger city with AntRay, a 7-mile light-rail system mostly above
ground, which was expanded, on the eve of EXPO 2016, to the airport and the fairground,
connecting the area directly to the airport. Taking the AntRay from Kepez to the airport takes
less than an hour, and costs an extremely affordable 3.20 TL ($0.55). A new tram line, which
will connect the existing line to the “nostalgic tram” starting at the city museum, which is right
next to Beach Park, is currently under construction. So a person who has a place in Sur Yapi
Antalya can land at the airport, take the tram to their flat, and go to the beach in the morning
rather easily. The land on which Kepez stands has thus been made extremely valuable, as it has
now become a central location.
When I mentioned this to multiple locals, the response I received was that “no local from
Antalya will move there because that’s the slum neighborhood,” “that’s what the reputation is,”
and so on and so forth. That, however, is not a problem at all for Sur Yapi, as this project is not
for the locals to be interested in anyway. Antalya is still receiving migrants from other cities, and
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even from other countries such as Russia. Given its moderate size and tolerable pace, it is a solid
alternative to larger cities like Istanbul and Ankara. It is also one of the largest city in southern
Turkey, drawing people from the region’s countryside when they decide to move to a city. Those
people will care less about the reputation of Kepez, and more about the quality of life and
services they are being offered, which will decidedly be high when the project is completed.
Moreover, Sur Yapi Antalya is being marketed abroad. The firm has recently opened a sales
office in Cologne, Germany, to advertise the project, along with their other projects, both to
German investors and those of Turkish descent who come back to Turkey regularly.183 As of
October 2019, people of 29 nationalities (Russia, England, South Korea…) and Turks living in
27 different countries have bought residences from the megaproject.184 Sur Yapi’s success is in
alignment in Antalya’s general success in selling residential property to foreigners, mostly from
Russia, England, and Germany, and more recently from Iraq, Iran, and other Middle Eastern
countries.185
Furthermore, the project has become, in Altan’s words, “a project of reference for the
entire world”186 (sic). Earlier in October, a group of representatives from the Commonwealth of
Independent States187 was hosted at the construction site under the banner of an international
construction working group. Local and national colleges bring their students to see the project,
which has received a Green Good Design Award in 2018 from the Chicago Athenaeum and was
one of the top 3 projects chosen by the European Union’s “Smart City” initiative.188
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The other obvious and probably more pressing question is what is happening to the
people who were living in Kepez and Santral neighborhoods. Of the 17000 residential units,
around 5400 are meant for them, with the choice of getting one to two units depending on the
size of their property. Which specific units they got was determined via lottery. They paid for the
difference in value between the residential units and the land they turned in, as calculated by the
authorities. Rental and moving assistance is being provided by the government until they get
their units, which is supposed to start happening this year.
The media coverage of the project oscillates between no coverage and positive coverage,
the latter regularly quoting affirmative or encouraging messages by mayors or ministers, most of
whom are involved with the project directly or indirectly. The occasional talk of concrete jungles
and some accusations of legal shenanigans (such as the start of sales before the issuance of a
construction permit189) notwithstanding, an overview of all the talk about the project suggests
that this is the best thing that has ever happened to Antalya. It also seems like the locals from
Kepez are content with the development. For example, the locally elected representative and
administrator (muhtar) of Kepez, Yusuf Kucukkaya, said this to a journalist back in January: “It
was hard, but in the end I made 99 percent of them believe in the project. Now they are all happy
and waiting for their apartments.”190 The sole piece of academic work I could find referring to
the project claims that “those who lived in the area and had land rights… approved the revisions
made to the reconstruction plan proposed by the metropolitan municipality and thus became
property owners. This shows that this urban transformation project has been ‘appropriate’ (sic).
In other words, this project in-hand dissolves the usual criticisms of Law No. 6306-associated
transformation projects, such as that they ‘distance local citizens from their neighborhoods and
189
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destroy the neighborhood culture.”191 But things are sometimes not what they seem to be, so I
got in touch with a couple I have known for years (let us call them X and Y), who exchanged
their property for two small units, and are now living in a different district an hour northwest of
Kepez, waiting for their apartment block’s completion.

Rumor 2: Late in 2018, a group of workers started a fire
in one of the blocks in protest of the company’s non-payment
of their wages. There exists no media coverage of the incident.

X and Y moved to Kepez in 1983 and a year after that they bought a parcel of land from a
local seller, on which they built their abode. This purchase, as was usual then, was not legal, but
more of an informal transfer of illegally claimed land via an unofficial land license (el senedi),
some of which were still around by the time urban transformation started. Throughout the 1990s,
because there was a possibility of a legal transfer of these lands to them, they paid assessors to
measure their property, as most of their neighbors did. This possibility was coupled with the
constant political promise of what might be called a “planning pardon” (imar affi) which would
legally acknowledge their buildings as residential units. They eventually were given a “land
licence acquisition document” (tapu tahsis belgesi), the legal condition of which is ambiguous to
say the least. They always paid taxes for the services they received (trash and road maintenance,
for example), which means that they were in the system. X and Y tell me that one of the reasons
why many people agreed with the project so easily was that it was a rather easy way out of the
legal limbo.
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X and Y chose to get two small units of 80 meters squared in exchange for their one story
house with a large garden. The difference they had to pay was 7200 Turkish liras ($1250), which
is not little. Three things they highlight: (1) the apartment blocks designated for them are not that
close to the main road, where the tramline is located, but instead closer to a correction facility,
which may be demolished. (2) They are told that their blocks and the common spaces associated
with them will be managed “neighborhood style,” that is, those who are living there will decide
on what services they want, which will supposedly help them keep the maintenance fees (aidat)
low. X and Y, however, are not really sure about that, as they claim that Sur Yapi will do their
best to keep all the blocks in top-shape (whatever that means to Sur Yapi) to keep the reputation
of the project good, hence its value high. This is important because maintenance fees in such
residential complexes can get notoriously high, and residents of some Sur Yapi projects in
Istanbul have been complaining online about how high their fees are for the quality of service
they get.192 (3) In 2018 (they do not remember exactly when), Sur Yapi got in touch with them to
let them know that they are adding two more stories to their buildings, and enlarging their (X and
Y’s) bathrooms in return, which would mean that the units on these two floors were not up for
grabs during the lottery. There is a slight chance that these last two floors are high enough to see
the sea, making them extremely valuable.
That being said, there is also another side to (3): these people are not necessarily used to
apartment-style living. Most of them used to have their own gardens in which they grew fruits
and vegetables, and some of them simply cannot live in such high altitudes. While X and Y got a
first floor unit from the lottery, in which they will probably live, someone they know got a 9th
floor unit and is thinking of selling and moving away. This is just one way in which the abovecited paper is wrong about how Sur Yapi Antalya does not “destroy neighborhood culture.” If
192
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altitude seems like a petty argument, these people will also lose access to informal systems of
credit, as their local market, which let them pay later for the stuff they bought if they did not
have all the money right then (veresiye), will not be there when they move back in. Similarly,
they will lose access to their gardens, where they grew their own food items. While Sur Yapi
insists on the abundance of the green spaces in their project, it would be unreasonable to expect
that they will let people keep chickens in those common areas. Similarly will be gone the small
workshops people used to run in the neighborhood, and, maybe most importantly, as the situation
of the 9th floor person suggests, there will be many people renting out or selling their units and
moving somewhere else, and it is hard to claim with ease that the neighborhood culture has not
changed when chunks of people who constituted that neighborhood are going away. Lastly, there
is also the problem of what will happen to the units bought by non-locals when they are not
there. Some will be rented during the off-season for sure, but there is a chance that there will be a
lot of empty spaces too. The fate of the Kepez locals might be a radical switch from the vibrant
neighborhood life of Kepez and Santral to the sparsely populated concrete jungle of Sur Yapi
Antalya. To respond to the scholars above, someone saying “yes” to something does not mean
that it is perfect –– it either means that it is better to say “yes” than to say “no,” or there is no
way to say “no.”

Rumor 3: The ferrochrome company might be closing soon,
and the land might be acquired by TOKI. That parcel is right
next to Sur Yapi Antalya, and TOKI and Sur Yapi might get in
a partnership to expand on the initial project.
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Nevertheless, X and Y are excited about their new apartment with natural gas. They get
their rental assistance regularly (with minor delays) and “trust” Sur Yapi. They wait for their
block’s completion, living in a small apartment not unlike the one they will hoepfully move in to
soon enough. As far as they are concerned, the company is already late –– they were at first told
that they would move in during Summer 2019. And even if their block were to be completed
right now, how nice would it be to live in the middle of a gargantuan construction site?
Since I left Antalya, things seem to have become a bit more convoluted. On Facebook
there exists multiple pages used by the people of Kepez and Santral neighborhoods to stay in
touch with each other about the construction. A page titled “Kepez Santral mah Hisse sahipleri
dayanışma/Birlik Grubu” (Kepez Santral neighb. Right owners resistance/Solidarity group) has
some recent construction photos to keep the community updated. On September 27, however, the
group’s administrator shared this message they got from CIMER (Presidency Communication
Center): “The firm running the project has asked for an extension. The relevant authorities are
currently talking with the firm about a potential time extension, and, if necessary, an extension of
the rental assistance. The residents will be updated as soon as possible.”193 On another page titled
“antalya kepez ve santral kentsel dönüşüm sur yapi mağdurlari” (antalya kepez and santral urban
renewal sur yapi victims), questions about the promised rental assistance abound, with people
asking each other whether they know when the assistance will be in. There are posts as recent as
the first week of December 2019, showing that the issue persists. While some comments exhibit
humor (“Ghosts ate your assistance”194), others show anger: “They won’t deposit it, forget it,
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now we go break Sur Yapi’s windows.”195 A post from November 28 claims: “You will wait for
a loooong time, they are having a hard time paying the workers.”196 Insults directed at Yusuf
Kucukkaya, the muhtar, are sprinkled here and there. One dissenter suggests that they stop
talking badly about the company and the project, because they might be reducing the values of
their properties. The synthesis of all of this is a graffiti shared by a user: an ad reads, “everyone
will be happy in this city” –– the graffiti painted right under reads, “except us.”197 This graffiti is
most likely from Istanbul (there are posts from 2016 in different contexts with the same graffiti),
as if to suggest, on a symbolic level, a connection with all those horrible examples of urban
renewal in Istanbul, where people not only did not get their rental assistance, but had to wait
years and years for their apartments, with some of them still waiting.
On a more positive note, these same pages are saturated with comments of people saying
that they should get together, organize, elect some spokespeople, resist, occupy Sur Yapi’s sales
office and the construction site, hold the muhtar and other governmental authorities accountable
–– in short, exhibit democratic will and demand that they get what they were promised, or, even
better, get what they deserve, like people did in 2013 during the protests, and kept Gezi Park in
its place.
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Conclusion: Going Forward

Earlier in 2019, the AKP government lost the metropolitan municipalites of Istanbul and
Antalya to CHP, suggesting that the people are fed up with their authoritarian neoliberalism, but
the more intriguing result in these local elections came, I believe, from the small province of
Tunceli, located 697 miles northeast of Antalya with a modest population of around 77 thousand.
For the first time in Turkish history, a candidate from the Turkish Communist Party won the race
for a metropolitan municipality –– a remarkable achievement given the terror against the left that
took place in the 1970s.
In 2014, Fatih Mehmet Maçoğlu was elected as the mayor of Ovacik, a minor district of
Tunceli, where he showcased what might be called a people’s entrepreneurial municipalism.
During his five-year tenure, as Reuters reports it, Macoglu “paid off most of the municipality’s
sizeable debt, provided free public transportation and opened up government land for
agriculture.”198 He increased the chickpea production in Ovacik, sent the goods to other cities to
be sold, and used the revenue raised to fund scholarships for students. He built two libraries
within the capitol building to foster book-reading. To increase democratic involvement, he
created councils for women and people with disabilities. Macoglu’s entrepreneurialism can be
seen most clearly in the opening of government land for the establishment of cooperative grain
farms, but it is one that grants the right to the city to its inhabitants: as Harvey would put it,
Macoglu’s “Ovacik Model,” as some call it now, has resulted in the “greater democratic control
over the production and utilization of the surplus”199 in Ovacik. Having now become the mayor
of Tunceli, Macoglu is implementing his system in the province-at-large. Tunceli, with its small
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population and land size, is no comparison to Antalya or Istanbul, and looks more like a
controlled experiment in perspective, but Macoglu wants to bring more tourists to Tunceli and to
travel abroad to talk to others about his progreesive municipal approach. His approach might be
extremely local, but his vision is globally-oriented: “The world’s resources are being wasted…
Half the world’s wealth belongs to just a small number of people, and makes people feel there’s
no possibility of justice and equality. We as socialists want to show policies against this mindset
are possible.”200
To say the least, Macoglu’s victory has unsettled some media outlets known to side with
the AKP government. Takvim201 published an article titled “Terrorist Supporter Macoglu Cut
Services to Tunceli,”202 claiming that the mayor has closed a tea garden, a food bank, a masjid,
and an infant care room. Macoglu was quick to respond to these allegations –– Takvim was not
the only newspaper targeting him –– using the municipality’s website, another example of his
devotion to transparency and constant communication: the tea garden was closed by the previous
mayor and it would be reopened soon, the masjid and the infant care room were never closed,
and the food bank was actually emptied by the previous government three days before Macoglu
took over the municipality, and, before that, was inappropriately serving food to the workers at a
local private textile factory, while the purpose of the food bank was to serve the students and
other desperate residents of Tunceli. After a thorough evaluation, Macoglu promised, the food
bank would be reopened.203
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AKP has multiple reasons to be hostile towards the Communist President. When asked
about Turkey’s involvement in Syria, Macoglu said: “The right to live for all living things is
sacred for us. I’m against violence.”204 Despite such claims, he is accused again and again of
having ties to Kurdish separationists, probably because he is a Zaza Kurd himself. More
relevantly, his support for transparency, democracy and egalitarian municipalism is at direct odds
with the governance model of AKP. As Uzun suggests, in Topbas’ Istanbul, “city-wide decisions
[were] discussed and criticised in the media and by professional associations only after they have
been made.”205 In Macoglu’s Tunceli, on the other hand, “the word, the authority, [and] the
decision”206 belong to the people of the city. Then the question arises: does the AKP government
see Macoglu’s “Ovacik Model” as a threat to the city governance model they put forward during
their tenure?
Furthermore, will Macoglu succeed in his experiment, without flirting with corruption
and getting crushed by global hegemonic forces? If he does, will the Ovacik Model become a
national (or global) standard for what progressives should demand in their own cities? These are
questions of time, not ours to answer, but what we can do is act.
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